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ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to analyze the reshaping of the state security device in Brazil 
justified by the challenge of hosting the World Cup and the Olympic Games. The advent of 
these events ignited security programs designed to face possible threats and also the 
strengthening of law enforcement capability. This security device, in a Foucauldian 
perspective, should be seen as a complex articulation between social practices around security, 
national securitization processes and new tactics of government over conducts, spaces and 
flows connected with transterritorial security strategies.  
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RESUMEN: Este artículo busca analizar la remodelación del dispositivo de seguridad estatal en 
Brasil justificado por el desafío de ser sede del Mundial y los Juegos Olímpicos. El 
advenimiento de estos eventos impulsó los programas de seguridad diseñados para enfrentar 
posibles amenazas y el fortalecimiento de la capacidad de aplicar la ley. Este dispositivo de 
seguridad, desde una perspectiva Foucaultiana, debería ser visto como una articulación 
compleja entre prácticas sociales en torno a la seguridad, procesos nacionales de securitización 
y nuevas tácticas de gobierno sobre conductas, espacios y flujos conectados con estrategias de 
seguridad transterritoriales.  
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…and there are those who claim for the lash  
for those who do not want to be pacified  
when the pacifiers make aim  
of course they start pacifying  
and sometimes they do pacify two birds with a single shot  
Mario Benedetti, “Ode to pacification”  
 
INTRODUCTION: THE CHOSEN CITY, THE PROMISED LAND 
Copenhagen, Denmark, October 2, 2009. In a full auditorium, representatives of many 
countries expected the International Olympic Committee final decision on the chosen city to 
host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The ultimate dispute opposed Rio de Janeiro and 
Madrid. In the audience, the Brazilian delegation was clearly anxious. The Brazilian 
investment in Rio’s nomination had been huge. Many years of attempts and millions of dollars 
had been spent in publicity and in social mobilization. The very composition of the delegation 
was a proof of the importance given to the initiative: the then President Lula da Silva himself, 
the soccer legend Pelé, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro Sergio Cabral Filho, the city’s mayor 
Eduardo Paes, besides the president of the Brazilian Olympic Confederation Carlos Arthur 
Nuzman, besides Guido Mantega, the Ministry of Finances. 
When the Committee official showed the name of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian authorities 
overreacted in joy. At the same time, milliards of cariocas, who were following live the Danish 
ceremony from an enormous screen, did the same at the sands of the iconic Copacabana beach. 
Previously, in 2007, Brazil had conquered the right to host the 2014 FIFA’s World Cup. The 
new challenge was perceived by the Lula Administration as another victory of its foreign policy 
and an evidence of the country's increasing credibility as an emerging economic and political 
power. A central issue stressed by the Brazilian propaganda for the Olympic Games – alongside 
tackling the notorious obsolescence of the national transportation infrastructure – was the 
promise to deal with chronic public safety problems in the country, especially in Rio de Janeiro. 
The delegation tried to demonstrate the coordinated efforts of city, state and federal 
governments toward the construction of an effective policy centered in the reduction of 
‘ordinary’ crimes (such as robbery) and drug-trafficking activities in Rio. 
The main element waved as a success experience was the so-called Units of Pacification 
Police (UPP), a state public-safety program focused on the Military Police occupation of 
favelas/slums and impoverished urban areas. Alongside the UPP Program, the authorities 
promised other initiatives such as the modernization of police techniques and equipment and 
the use of high-tech devices and processes to monitor and control Rio’s streets and favelas. 
Before the realization of the 2013 FIFA’s Confederation Cup and the 2014 FIFA’s World Cup 
many of these promises had been set in course. The UPP Program, for example, had expanded 
its range of occupied favelas from 01 unit in 2008 up to 38 in 2014, and the national Army had 
begun to collaborate with it after three massive operations that took place in late 2010 
(Rodrigues, 2016). Since 2010, Rio has hosted major events such as the 2012 UN Conference 
in Sustainable Development (Rio+20), as well as many private-sector fairs and music festivals. 
However, the major sports events appeared the most credible justification for a whole 
transformation of the city's infrastructure associated with a new security plan to embrace Rio 
de Janeiro, shifting the targets its landscape and the surveillance and police tactics toward its 
population. 
In the context of these two major events, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer 
Olympics, this paper aims to present some analytical insights on which we repute to be a 
securitization move toward a new urban policy for Rio de Janeiro. We are going to focus on 
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the study of the UPP Program and the Army’s Pacification Force established in two phases: 
the first one from December 2010 to July 2012 and the second reedited in April 2014. Our 
preliminary hypothesis is that the organization of major sport events has been strategically used 
as a doorway to readapt and transform the traditional security practices in Rio shaping a 
modality of security device we are provisionally calling modus military composed by elements 
of the urban militarism (Graham, 2010), police intervention, and new and subtler practices of 
control and surveillance. We argue that these new techniques of government have been 
remodeling the biopolitical government tactics in Rio, as described by Michel Foucault (1999; 
2008), into a set of new tactics constitutive of what Gilles Deleuze (1992) called the society of 
control. 
 
VIOLENCE AND (IN) SECURITY SPEECH AS AN URBAN CONTROL APPARATUS 
Understanding the production of (in) security elements as a way to control urban spaces is 
related, ultimately, to the control of significant elements of the life of individuals and their 
collectiveness. Thus, the determination of the role of certain spaces, the foreseen conducts of 
individuals and the social characteristics and behavior which are accepted or not, are 
operationalized within what Michel Foucault (2003) called as biopolitics, the set of government 
tactics that emerged in Europe in the passage of the 18th century to the 19th century, focused on 
the control and the management of entire populations, regulating the dynamics of individual 
and collective life, simultaneously interested in each individual attitude in his or her daily 
activities and the general dynamics of population (such as its birth and death rates, the general 
index of diseases and epidemics, the quality and location of city’s territorial occupation, etc.). 
Through these analytical lenses, the discussion about reframing the standards of what can 
be understood as public or private spaces or life can be better grasped within an even wider 
dynamic, since biopolitics is not only aiming at controlling biological life, understood merely 
as "bare life" (Agamben, 1995), but actually at promoting an extra or a surplus of life, as 
characterized by Foucault – i.e. an enhancement in the physical health for the industrial 
workforce – combined with a reduction in the capacity for revolt and insubordination, achieved 
by the articulation among state repression, social policies (welfare policies) and an array of 
disciplinary tactics applied to individuals in several places such as schools, factories, hospital 
facilities, families, religious congregations, and the punitive archipelago (courts, jails, prison 
facilities, and the criminal underworld) (Foucault, 1999; 2003). For instance, Mark Duffield 
(2008: 35) states that biopolitics is essentially centralized in order to "restrict or manage the 
movement of lives [considered] potentially threatening or incomplete".  
In this sense, the actors who could not fit a given social, moral and economic order would 
be excluded from social dynamics through the uplifting of material/concrete or symbolic 
barriers. This exclusion, however, does not mean invisibility or the will to ignore the existence 
of these people. Social groups considered undesirable or dangerous to the constituted political-
economic order, would fit, as second-hand armies, to control and shape the working classes, 
by suffering the daily harassment of security forces and armed groups (both legal and illegal), 
the heavy hand of the criminal justice system, isolation in neighborhoods/ghettos/slums and, 
finally, the entrance into the penitentiary archipelagos. The reflections get more amplitude 
when we enmesh them with the concepts covered by Loïc Wacquant (2009: 122), mainly the 
so-called new governability of social insecurity. The sociologist defines it as a centralizing 
apparatus for the management of the society, mainly focusing poverty, aiming at shaping 
individual behavior in favor of a given economical order, especially the contemporary 
neoliberalism. Consequently, this system would integrate criminal control mechanisms and 
spatial occupation strategies in order to contain forms of marginalization associated with such 
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neoliberal processes. 
Thus, the combination of co-optation, territorial control, discipline and punishment would 
be the attempt of certain state forces to manage the increasing isolation, poverty and endemic 
insecurity of the metropolis, in a tactical set of governmental practices that emphasizes its logic 
in the production of controlling tactics directed both to the productive individuals in the current 
global economic order and to those interpreted as undesirable and/or dangerous to the same 
order. The articulation of the controls of life and spatial occupation, in this holistic framework, 
yields a purposely vague set of procedures, which incorporates different kinds of policies. The 
most significant reflection, however, in making this combination of Foucault & Wacquant 
assumptions is the absolute impossibility to separate the social actors and the urban spaces in 
which they are included. This co-constitutive system leads us to conclude that the political 
action that aims at reframing the urban space will necessarily have to deal with individuals. 
When one embraces in this equation the variable “violence”, especially that which is 
symbolically legitimized, it instills its own rationality manifested essentially in the actions 
aimed to control populations socially constructed as unwanted (Rodrigues, Brancoli & Amar, 
2017). 
Such use of a public security discourse for such a transformation in urban dynamics and its 
population distribution is echoed in what Goonewardena & Kipfer (2007) understands as 
urbicide. According to these authors, it is the condensed political violence directed to 
specifically “kill” urban areas, especially those containing individuals that are perceived as 
threats to the established order. Although the authors employ this consideration to analyze 
cases in the Middle East – such as the process that has led to the interruption of electricity 
services for the Iraqi Kurdistan – we believe that it can also be applied to the case of Rio de 
Janeiro regarding the process of urban rearrange justified to prepare the city for the Olympics 
and the World Cup. The application of this concept is possible since other similar analytical 
exercises related to mega-events in mega-event host cities, like London, Beijing, Seoul and Rio 
itself, have paid attention to significant urban transformations and to the violation of civil rights 
of impoverished populations who were previously settled in regions affected by infrastructure 
or urbanist remodeling for the games (Nobre, 2017; Di Vita & Morandi, 2018; Joo, Bae & 
Kassens-Noor, 2017). 
The proliferation of urbicide practices is related to changes that place the policies for the 
cities and their population as a central element in the production and creation of social relations, 
opening a new agenda for biopolitical practices. Following this logic, “the struggle for the city 
now coincides more and more with the competition for social order” (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 
2007: 241). The dichotomy inside/outside, indicated by R.B.J. Walker (1993) as the founder 
of modern political discourse that shapes and justifies the existence of the state as the promoter 
of peace and security within its borders – while the international arena remained as the locus 
for “anarchy”, “chaos” and, in extremis, “warfare” – is, in fact, brought inside national borders, 
placing itself in the urban level. It is to say that no longer just the inside (the nation-state) and 
the outside (international space) can define political communities and can summarize the 
production of political and ethical subjectivities such as “Us” versus “Others” or “Allies” 
versus “Enemies” (Rodrigues, 2018). There is now something we might call the separation 
between integrated and segregated areas within states that sets in motion a ghettoization logic 
(Passetti, 2011) sustained by that combination of social policies aimed at the poorest and the 
underprivileged neighborhoods with updating repressive practices (police and military) in 
these same areas. 
Thus, the opposition inside/outside could be redirected to discuss the current production of 
urban spaces, especially when it is the case to understand the creation of bordering procedures 
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between those who belong to a particular political community and those who do not belong, 
being removed and replaced by a combination of violent and subtle, stealth tactics. This process 
was preceded and followed by legal adaptations in the countries where mega-events were 
supposed to happen. These adaptations aimed at intellectual property rules, as well as new legal 
frameworks regarding real estate investments and urban planning norms which have opened 
new paths for unpopular decisions and violent public and private actions toward specific urban 
areas and their population. In sum, under the justification of being prepared for the mega-
events, cities and countries such as Rio/Brazil, changed a set of legal dispositions (as we are 
going to further discuss) in an attempt to normalize practices that would have been unbearable 
in other circumstances. 
This process resembles Giorgio Agamben’s discussion on the normalization of rules and 
practices of exception in contemporary democracies. In fact, the Italian philosopher (Agamben, 
1995: 151) points out that the concept of exception in modern political analysis can be 
condensed into two positions. On the one hand, the perspective of the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt, who analyzes the state's intrinsic mandate to discretionarily declare periods of 
exceptionality, and, on the other hand, Walter Benjamin’s stance, which indicated that 
cultivating states of emergency had turned into normalcy, a permanent situation. Expressing a 
reflection that tries to integrate these models, Agamben argues that in contemporary liberal 
democracies exceptional spaces occupy a gray zone between violence and the law. In this 
sense, contemporary politics would be at the same time outside the legal liberal boundaries as 
well an integral part of its constitution, forming conditions to decide on which subject should 
be included or excluded – and, ultimately, eliminated – within a given political order. Agamben 
employs the Roman concept of homo sacer (sacred man) to define the elements of this 
exceptionality (Aganben, 1995: 8) in present time liberal democracies. Based on the distinction 
between "political life" (zoe) and "bios" (bare life), the Italian philosopher argues that liberal 
democracies seek to expunge the latter, while seeking to include it and pacifying it, reclaiming 
it into political life. The sacred man, in this case, is the individual reduced to bare life, an 
element that occupies the gray zone that characterizes the state of permanent exception. This 
point is significantly important for the creation of another argument: the sacred man is also the 
one that is interpreted as a threat and, therefore, needs to be obliterated, controlled and, if this 
is not possible, cauterized. 
Urban spaces which are currently occupied by the State’s Armed Forces (police and 
military) combine the presence of daily physical violence (murders, assassinations, arbitrary 
imprisonments, moral and sexual harassments perpetrated by public armed officers and private 
militias), physical barriers (walls, concertinas, check points), and the increasing use of 
technological resources such as surveillance cameras, drones, and biometric devices (Graham, 
2010). Substantial parts of the cities, like in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and less privileged areas, 
are inhabited by a combination of impoverished workers – who everyday come outside to 
perform their activities during the day, coming back home for the night – and homo sacer (drug 
dealers, homeless people, poor transgender and prostitutes, miserable drug users, unemployed 
and illiterate persons). These parts of the city have been traditionally targeted by the public 
safety policies which try to contain rebellions and illegal activities outside the limits of the 
“segregate zones” (Alves & Evanson, 2013; Brancoli & Vasques, 2016). However, we claim 
that the preparation for the mega-events have boosted the operations and biopolitical actions 
toward those areas and populations, gathering a renewed social support from middle and high 
income social groups who saw in it a window opportunity to secure their own position in 
society through the city landscape under the morally acceptable excuse offered by the 
preparation for the games. 
Thus, the actions of (re)occupation of urban space by state forces and private actors are 
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pervaded by a rationality of determination and social hierarchy of spaces, through which areas 
– and individuals contained therein – must be systematized, monitored, evaluated and then 
separated into a binary logic of friend/enemy, pacific/threatening. The use of violence in such 
cases becomes a condition, and mainly, a justification, to ensure that certain action of 
occupation is employed. We believe that the combination of these analytical approaches, 
supported by the urban space construction categorizations out above, make up a powerful 
theoretical framework to understand how the new surveillance policies reframe public spaces 
in Rio.  
 
BRAZIL’S MAJOR EVENTS AND THE NEW SECURITIZATION DISCOURSES  
The arrival of mega-events in Brazil, and especially at the city of Rio de Janeiro, can be 
understood as a period of galvanization of the discourses that seek to enable tactics of urban 
reframing. With the justification of the necessity to change the city to receive these events, new 
security and urban practices were adopted. On the one hand, there was a modification in the 
way public armed agents (the Military Police and the Armed Forces) were engaged in public 
safety operations. On the other hand, there was a transformation on how private security agents 
(both Brazilian and foreign companies) have been summoned to secure some neighborhoods, 
touristic areas, working fields for the games infrastructure, private enterprises (hotels, 
restaurants, the docks, etc.). This section will shed some light over the latter.  
Hiring "private soldiers" has become a well-known subject since the many scandals related 
to the use of private military companies by the US government during the military operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s which has renewed the interest in the role of the so-
called “mercenaries” in contemporary conflicts (Percy, 2007). 
The exponential increase of the presence of these actors has resulted in a significant 
expansion of concern by human rights activists and analysts alarmed with the lack of control 
of the use of force in situations of conflict in urban areas (Rodrigues et al., 2017). However, 
the privatization of security and its consequences go far beyond the activities of hired soldiers. 
In addition to these agents, there is a range of daily activities that are occupied by an 
increasingly number of privatized actors. Away from the spotlight, the private security market 
– gathering a multitude of means, from armed personal escort to alarm installing services – 
already represented, in 2009, a global market of more than 160 billion dollars (Abrahamsen & 
Williams, 2010). From companies that perform risk analysis to those who offer public spaces 
protection, the numbers of private actors in the security sector in Latin America overcomes 
those of the police personnel (Percy, 2007).  
A 2001-research, for example, shows that there already over 330,000 private guards 
working in the Brazilian megalopolis of São Paulo, with non-registered businesses employing 
estimated 600,000 people (Wood & Cardia, 2006). For comparative purposes, the Military 
Police in that state currently has a total of 81,357 soldiers (Ministry of Justice, 2014). This 
process of privatization, as pointed by Leander (2005), indicates a change in what we 
understand as security provision in modern communities: 
we are in the midst of a potentially large transformation in the tools that ensure order and safety 
in liberal democratic societies, a [change] which is leading to fragmentation 6 and 
diversification of police provision, and being led by a number of agencies and agents, each with 
different responsibilities to provide policing and accountability”.  
That argument finds support in the reflections of Sassen (2009) on the effects of 
globalization. In this analysis, the globalizing processes could not be understood as the 
"dismantling" of national states, while we find a corresponding "assembly" of new "global 
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conjunctions". Within this perspective, globalization – and privatization – are not simply forces 
eroding the states, since these are included even assisting the supposed process of 
"dismantling" (Sassen, 2009: 224).  
Addressing the privatization of security as a simple process of deterioration of traditional 
authority hinders the analysis of important variables, especially the changes taking place within 
the official institutions and in the public space. The enhancement of the private agents’ relative 
and absolute capabilities is directly associated with changes in the roles and responsibilities of 
the states, and, in most cases, occurs with the support and encouragement of the state structures 
and, particularly, of governmental, elected representatives themselves. This dual process of 
assembly/disassembly was first presented in the specific case of private agents by Williams & 
Abrahansen (2012). The authors suggest a model to analyze private agents acting on space 
formerly understood as public. In the specific case of this article, as private actors contribute 
to the establishment of the reframing processes of urban space, privatization becomes an 
important variable of a larger process of restructuring and reconfiguration of what is 
understood as public and private.  
Much of the discussion in relation to non-state actors involved in security practices are 
commonly centered on reflections about the threats that such agents can represent for 
government authority structures. In this sense, the growth of private armed actors would not 
necessarily be related to a decrease of state authority and the erosion of the legitimacy of the 
use of force. That is why, in the present analysis, we prefer to address these questions through 
the lens of reframing: the presence of such actors actually indicates changes in the state and at 
the symbolically legitimate forms for the use of force. The presence of such actors represents 
the emergence of new security structures that recombine practices that were previously 
dichotomist. State capacity, within this scenario, is certainly reconfigured, but not necessarily 
weakened.  
The consideration made by Pierre Bourdieu (1988) highlights some of this reconfiguration. 
For the French sociologist, the state is the "culmination of a process of concentration of 
different types of capital within a specific field [of power]" (Bourdieu, 1988: 13). In this sense, 
the constitution of the state agent is related to the construction of a power field in which several 
actors vying that has the greatest legitimacy to exert force. From this premise, the question 
again is not centered on whether the state is losing or gaining strength due to the presence of 
private actors, but as the relations of such agents within the security field are being modified. 
Employing Bourdieu structures, to understand the changes of the actors in the field is, in 
essence, getting how state power is being reconfigured. These changes in the relations between 
public and private may indicate, as puts Garland (2001: 124), the emergence of a third force in 
providing security, in conjunction with the police and the armed forces. According to the 
author, instead of imagining that they can monopolize control of crime, or to exercise their 
sovereign powers in complete disagreement with the powers of other actors, state agencies are 
now adopting the strategy of relating to other forces of social control. Hence, the resignification 
of public safety and of private safety in the urban environment, based on the examples given 
above, establish a model in which non-state and state actors use violence – physical or symbolic 
– to reconfigure the occupation of spaces. 
This dynamic seeks to eliminate possible threats or to revamp old spaces to establish a new 
economic relationship with the territory. These actions are often justified by projections or 
resizing of an enemy – this enemy who, in Rio de Janeiro, is traditionally translated in the 
figure of the young, black and impoverished inhabitant of favelas –. Since the 1980s, this 
“threatening persona” has been especially depicted through the image of the drug dealer and 
the criminal gangs dedicated to drug trafficking (Rodrigues & Labate, 2016). In the specific 
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case of Rio de Janeiro, there are systematic social “consensus” so that, by the virtue of future 
mega-events, private security agents remain responsible for providing security in the vicinity 
of strategic areas and to map as many possible potential unstable contexts.  
Just as was attempted at the London Olympics in 2012, private security companies such as 
G4S already signaled they would remain proactive in the recognition of potential instability, it 
is the post 9/11 preemption model. Present in almost all forms of control in the UK, this 
company drew particular attention by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for 
monitoring around the stadiums. These agents would be responsible not only for the security 
environment, but also for in the identification of potential risks. This ability to indicate possible 
risks is at the core of these security processes and, accordingly, private agents would be at the 
heart of the ability to indicate who may or may not occupy any space.  
Ericson and Haggerty point out that liberal democracies are above all risk societies in which 
"governance is directed to the provision of security” (1997: 95). In this context, rationale and 
security practices would be centered around the identification, tracking and 
containment/elimination of risks. Within this rationale, the layout of the tendency of 
individuals would be actually guided by a binary logic of "friend/enemy" to indicate, ultima 
ratio, which actors could essentially occupy certain social and urban space. The increasing 
relevance of a private rationality with the ability to determine what are the spaces and agents 
able – and thus legitimate – to control a given population seems to indicate a possible common 
denominator for such risk-assessment dynamics. 
In London, the transformation of the surveillance and control systems based on video 
cameras and sophisticated computer programs into facial identification started being enforced 
before the preparations for the 2012 Olympics. The current surveillance system was installed 
after the Irish Republican Army bomb-attacks in the late 1990s and the new security measures 
taken after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 2005 jihadist bombings that 
shook the city (Davis, 2017). The combination of state security policies and private security 
contractors in London followed similar patterns established in the USA and also exported to 
other parts of the world, such as the Rio de Janeiro´s Summer Olympics. One example is the 
construction by Rio’s municipal administration of the Rio Operational Center (ROC), 
inaugurated in 2010 and announced as the “first Olympic equipment delivered by Rio’s 
municipal administration” (COR, n/d). According to COR's website, the operational center is 
a high-tech “GQ for the integration of urban operations in Rio” (COR, n/d). A set of TV screens 
is connected 24/7 to 800 municipalities’ cameras which are monitoring streets, avenues, bus 
stations, touristic areas, and public buildings. The center has also access to another 700 cameras 
which belongs to private contractors of public services (such as bus companies and ferryboat 
services). All this equipment is connected to state agencies, especially the State Secretary of 
Public Safety and the State Secretary of Civil Defense. This integrated system sets alerts 
reporting all kinds of phenomena, covering natural disasters, car accidents, as well as 
demonstrations, a surveillance that has allowed police forces to monitor and identify people 
who have been protesting against federal and state administrations since 2013 (Rodrigues & 
Augusto, 2016). 
Hence, the production of newspacialities in Rio de Janeiro – which requires new means for 
control and surveillance – has been possible by a combination of the traditional and off-spread 
discourses of fear (particularly against impoverished and black people living in favelas) with 
novel justifications related to the so-called urgency of pacifying the city to make it fit to host 
major events. As the local, white middle class used to say when confronted with a situation 
they deemed unsatisfactory for the gringo: “Imagine this during the World Cup!”. 
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A PACIFIED CITY?  
The concept of pacification belongs to the ethos of the Brazilian Armed Forces, especially the 
Army. Since the country’s independence from Portugal, in 1822, the protagonist role of the 
military has been central in any understanding of the political arrangements and to the 
definition of political order. The military presence in national political life is historically 
intrinsically associated with the presumed perennial mandate to counter (or to pacify) 
rebellions and challenges to the established political order. The political and social relevance 
of the Brazilian Army increased after its victory in the civil war in Southern Brazil (1835-
1845), and particularly after the triumph of the Triple-Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay) in the Paraguayan War (1864-1870). Claiming more participation and valorization 
in the Monarchical rule, part of the young Army officials opened itself to ideas such as slave 
Abolitionism, Republicanism and the French Positivism. The so-called “proclamation of the 
Republic”, in 1889, was a military coup against the Monarchy lead by some of the most 
outstanding Army officials of that generation. 
Thenceforth the Army has become an unavoidable political and social actor in Brazil. The 
two first (and the eighth) Presidents of the new Republic were field-marshals, the Getúlio 
Vargas dictatorship (1930-1945) was based on military support (Vargas himself had a military 
background), the first democratic president after that was a general (Eurico Dutra, Vargas’ 
Ministry of War), and the recent dictatorship (1964-1985) was established and conducted by a 
civil-military coalition lead by the Army. In such a context, one of the main elements of the 
Brazilian Army identity is the sign of modernization associated with the character of 
pacification. Still during the Monarchy period in the 19th century, the consolidation of the 
Emperor Pedro II’s rule over rebel provinces was possible due to the organization and 
mobilization of a national Army, which combined military troops and local militias led by 
landowners who were made “colonels” of a National Guard (Souza, 2017). 
Those victories were commonly named as pacification campaigns. The image of the 
pacifying military also continued in two other fields: first of all, in the use of the Army to 
combat popular upheavals both in rural and urban spaces (the former considered 
archaistic/monarchist and the latter revolutionary/leftist) in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century; and the second one, in the march heading the vast West, taking terrain from native 
peoples of Central Brazil and the Amazon. The task of controlling and disciplining nomad 
indigenous peoples by the Army, led in particular by marshal Cândido Rondon, during the 
initial decades of the 20th century, was also known as “pacification” (Gomes, 2014; Lima, 
2017). It is more than a simple coincidence that the current reentrance of the military into 
operations inside Brazilian borders has been pervaded by the “pacification ethos” (Gomes, 
2014; Rodrigues, 2016). 
The Army was requested, since the 1990s, to engage missions related to the combat of 
organized crime and drug-trafficking. According to Roy Kitchener’s (1993) argument, this 
engagement was possible due the articulation of three vectors: one external, and two tributaries 
of internal factors. The external vector answered the US diplomatic-military pressures related 
to the “war on drugs” strategy launched in the early 1970s by the Richard Nixon Administration 
and reinforced by Ronald Reagan’s and George H. Bush’s during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, this response was not comparable in terms of intensity and efforts to the 
Colombian, Peruvian or Mexican military engagement, notably since the 1980s, where the 
military has assumed key positions in the public safety administration, as well as occupying 
entire cities and regions in the name of fighting drug-trafficking organizations (Marcy, 2010; 
Rodrigues, 2012). The first internal vector was linked to the incipient process of redefinition 
of the armed forces role in a period of distrust in a newly democratic rule (after the long 
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dictatorship) which have found the blurred frontiers between national security and public safety 
represented by drug-trafficking as a possible new orientation for the military. Finally, the 
second internal vector was connected to the generalized social fear – especially in the major 
cities – with criminality and the use of illegal drugs. This fear started supporting a new 
generation of severe criminal laws aiming practices such as drug-trafficking and kidnapping. 
The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a considerable increase of the military 
summoning to act in functions described as subsidiary such as monitoring cities during national 
and local voting processes and general security in major events such as the 1992 UN 
Environment Conference in Rio de Janeiro. During the Lula Administration (2003-2010) this 
role went even further. The main movement in this direction was the promulgation of the 
Complementary Law 136, in August 2010 (CL 136/2010). This law restructured and amplified 
previous decisions related to the use of military force within Brazilian borders, manly in the 
so-called law and order guarantee operations. After that, among other novelties, the Brazilian 
Federal Government, through its President and its Ministry of Defense, was authorized to 
deploy military from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to support state governments facing 
problems in public safety. The CL 136/2010 defined that in response to state level demands, 
Federal Government would be able to establish a military operation to intervene in a city or 
region, following a strategic plan with clear definition of the territory under intervention and 
the time lapse of its employment. 
One peculiarity of this Act is the determination of authority and command during the 
operation: due to the legal text the whole authority will remain upon the force commander 
pointed out by the President. Thereby, the state security forces (Military Police and Civil 
Police), usually responsible respectively for street policing and investigation, will not respond 
to the Governor’s orders, but to the General-Officer in charge. Interestingly, this particular kind 
of submission recalls the national security system operating during the civil-military rule when 
the Army had direct control over state Military Police. This kind of control was confronted by 
new democratic-elected governors after 1985 being changed in the 1988 Constitution. The new 
Constitutional text gave to the state governors the power to indicate the Military Police 
commanders without Army’s approval (Hunter, 1997). Thus the 2010 Act opened a new path 
for the interference of the military into state security matter. 
The largest recent experience of military intervention in public safety comes precisely from 
this context. After a previous experience of joint operation to siege the Complexo do Alemão 
(a set of fifteen favelas) during Rio’s 2007 Pan-American Games (Alves & Evanson, 2013), in 
October 2010, based on 136/2010 Act, Governor Sergio Cabral Filho formally asked for federal 
support to fight drug gangs active in Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha (a 
neighboring set of ten favelas). President Lula immediately authorized the Ministry of Defense 
to deploy a concerted maneuver involving the military, the Federal Police and the Federal 
Highroad Police in order to invade the Complexo do Alemão. In the last days of November 
2010, an offensive took place through a huge operation combining federal forces, the state 
Military Police, and the state Civil Police with the support of Marines who offered transport 
tanks used to introduce deep inside the favelas the highly-militarized MP’s platoon for special 
operations (BOPE). 
The massive media diffusion was plenty of military connotations such as “invasion”, “re-
conquest”, and “victory” (Rodrigues, 2016). Alongside images of Brazilian flags waving in the 
inner areas of the slums, the word “pacification” reemerged once again. In fact, this word had 
resurfaced two years before, in 2008, when the Rio de Janeiro state government started a 
program of public safety called Units of Pacifying Police (UPP). This program was inspired in 
similar initiatives taken previously in cities like Medellin (Colombia) based on the purpose of 
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reoccupying slums and neighborhoods controlled by criminal gangs. The supposed novelty of 
this relied on the combination of coactive measures (military and police occupation) with social 
programs and public policy initiatives (communitarian police, professionalizing courses, public 
healthcare, public schools, electricity and internet networks, garbage collection, etc.). In Rio, 
the first step of the UPP programs is under the responsibility of the Public Safety secretariat 
which ordered the Military Police to invade and occupy beforehand selected slums, 
establishing after that fortified bases deep inside the maze of poor houses. The first strike 
belongs to BOPE. The initial incursion then is followed by the entrance of regular Military 
Police allegedly prepared with special courses on human rights and proximity policing skills. 
The UPP Program goal was to guarantee the state presence to assure the beginning of the 
pacifying move. 
The selection of the slums deserves a special remark. Rio de Janeiro is an 8 million people-
city with reported 763 slums that gather around 1.4 million of its inhabitants. Until 2017 the 
UPP Program has occupied 40 slums in a space design that coincides with the southern zone 
of the city (the richest and touristic region), the central zone (the financial center and the port), 
the Northern zone (middle class area nearby the center and southern zone) and the part of the 
northern zone located in the path to the international airport. The vast majority of the slums 
still remain in drug gangs or militias (paramilitary forces formed by ex-policemen, ex-
firefighters, and ex-military). The area covered by UPP is precisely the postcard worldwide 
known and the city’s financial heart. This is not the purpose of this article to discuss the 
characteristics of this Program, its problems, questions and allegedly current collapse (Arias & 
Barnes, 2017); however, it is necessary to point out that the UPP Program is not limited to 
secure the major events host by Rio de Janeiro, but it is quite connected to them (Valente, 
2016). 
The ability to convince the International Olympic Committee and FIFA of the state’s 
capacity to assure security for the games was key for the success of Rio’s nomination for both 
mega-events. In that process, the main challenge for the state government was to pacify 
Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha. Both, Alemão and Penha, alongside their 
neighbor Complexo da Maré (a set of fifteen favelas), follow the highway that links the 
international airport to the city’s central and southern zones, which is also one of the main 
entrances of the city. To face this, the Governor asked, as exposed above, for federal support. 
Differently from the other UPP incursions, the Alemão and Penha operations were followed 
by a novel modality of mission led directly by the Army. 
In December 2010, the Ministry of Defense announced the organization of the Pacification 
Force, composted by Army troops which occupied the Complexos for one year and half, 
leaving the region in July 2012 to give passage for UPP’s installations. The Pacification Force 
used during all that period troops previously deployed in Haiti (under the UN flag in the 
Mission for the Haiti’s Stabilization), being trained and prepared to act in the Caribbean 
country in a very similar scenario (the slum maze) and under similar formalities and norms (the 
UN Rules of Engagement in Haiti case and the guarantee of law and order legislation in the 
Brazilian case). In April 2014, a few weeks before the beginning of the FIFA’s World Cup, a 
second Army’s Pacification Force occupied the Complexo da Maré, nearby the international 
airport and the highways arriving in Rio. The know-how acquired in Haiti and in Alemão and 
Penha has brought to the discussion the reemergence of a military activism in domestic security 
affairs (Gomes, 2014). This military occupation ended in June 2015, but opened a window for 
further interventions justified by the allegedly Rio de Janeiro state’s bankruptcy. In July 2017, 
the federal government signed another agreement with the Rio de Janeiro’s Governor in order 
to deploy military troops to support law enforcement in the whole state in the so-called 
“Operation Rio” (Rodrigues, Brancoli & Amar, 2017). 
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The indication of this Force with the qualitative Pacification could be seen not merely as a 
reference to the UPP Program, but broadly to the older and more complex heritage related to 
the military ethos and self-image. When this paper was concluded, the 2nd Pacification Force 
was still at the Maré’s poor streets and alleys. 
 
RIO AS AN “AMBIENCE OF SECURITY”  
The presence of the military in favelas could be interpreted as a sign of an increasing 
militarization of public safety in Brazil. However, this process is not so clear and flat. First, 
saying that Brazil is going through an unparalleled process of militarization would be imprecise 
in light of repeated interventions of the Brazilian military in domestic politics and of their 
historical social presence. It also would bypass the daily militarization of public safety by the 
state Military Police, a gendarmerie-type corporation linked to the Army through 
Constitutional determination (Hunter, 1997; Rodrigues, 2015).   
The very concept of militarization is not pacified. Some analysts define it as the direct 
presence of the military in repressive or preemptive policing (Zaverucha, 2000). Others offer 
a broader definition which includes not only that police role but also the presence of high-range 
military officers in key commander positions in public safety and national security (Benítez-
Manaut, 2010). Alternatively, authors like Graham (2010) are interested in the “insignia of the 
military”, a kind of military mark or general style of conceiving security, which would be 
present in almost every major city in the world. Graham highlights the generalized use of 
surveillance and control technologies (such as cameras, databases, biometrics, GPS, etc.) and 
the general acceptance that state forces (and even private companies) could trace, tape, register 
and watch each single movement of any citizen in the name of order and security. 
This permission to be controlled was noted by many authors, like Zygmunt Bauman (2003; 
2013), as an element of contemporary societies: the fear and the belief that a surprising and 
terrible attack could occur anytime and anywhere would have brought the state power to its 
simplest and basic Hobbesian character of security provider. In that sense, people living in 
“societies of fear” could allow tough measures of security to provide protection against 
invisible or almost unpredictable enemies such as terrorism, illegal immigrants, criminals, 
drugs dealers, etc. This “securitization demand” comes not only from the state or private 
enterprises of the security sector. It is possible to identify this kind of demand coming from 
bellow, including significant part of favelas’ and low-income social segments, as well as the 
middle and the higher classes. A common feeling of general insecurity and claim for the 
straightening of security policy pervade Brazilian society. 
The internal process of securitization in Brazil ignites, as put by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde 
(1998), particular security policies supported by large segments of Brazilian society. These 
policies include the reshaping of the urban spaces that redefine the flow of people, vehicles, 
products, and the redesign of private and public investment zones. The UPP Program 
associated with the Army’s Pacification Force could be understood as part of a state 
mobilization to reorganize the urban space in order to allow public and private investments and 
to secure the circulation of tourists, while answering social claims for more security. 
According to Graham (2010), the process of “urban militarization” is not limited to the 
presence of the military. In fact, for him, only few urban places exhibit open or visible 
indications of militarization (such as the pacified favelas in Rio). In general, it is the presence 
of the whole plethora of technology devices of control that establishes the daily experience of 
military urbanism. The employment of usual equipment such as personal computers, GPS 
transponders, surveillance cameras, electric bars etc. are not followed by the conscience of 
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their military origins (and their military active capability of controlling one’s movements and 
actions). 
In such a context, parts of the urban space are identified as dangerous zones that must be 
countered and isolated. These zones correspond to what Edson Passetti (2003) amplifies as 
“open-air concentration camps”: favelas, ghettos, low-income residential neighborhoods that 
are not excluded from the city – because their inhabitants work, circulate and consume in the 
city’s “secure zones” –, but that are kept in close control by the security forces (both state and 
private). The dangerous zones are targets for security policies such as the Pacification Program 
because they are conceived as “enemy territories” where live hostile populations, or at least, 
“hostile individuals” or “groups” that are considered the current version of the historically 
reedited figure of the “internal enemy” (Rodrigues, 2015). Some of the “internal enemy” could 
be directly assassinated by the state forces or imprisoned with large social support: Brazilian 
police is broadly recognized as one of the most lethal in the world and the Brazilian prison 
system is the third largest in the globe (Conjur, 2017). 
However, the most significant part of the dangerous social groups is controlled on a daily 
basis by a sophisticated combination of governmental tactics. The biopolitical tactics, as 
described by Foucault (2008), are nowadays articulated with technological devices and 
procedures that reconfigure the modes of controlling urban spaces and people’s movements 
and actions. While thinking about the changing character of late 20th century’s societies, Gilles 
Deleuze (1992) defined new forms of governing people, flows and spaces as “societies of 
control”. For Deleuze, the discontinued modes of governing people in the disciplinary society 
analyzed by Foucault (in schools, prisons, factories, hospitals, etc.) have been incremented by 
other modalities of continuing control also due the new varieties of technological apparatuses 
and procedures. Biometric devices, password scanning, databases, electronic handcuffs and 
collars, credit card integrated systems or GPS services could potentially control every single 
step and transaction. According to Deleuze (1992: 7), “the conception of a control mechanism, 
given the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (…) is not 
necessarily one of science fiction”. 
What governmental tactics seek now is to localize, scan, and prefigure movements in open 
spaces, giving freedom for the circulation of capital and goods, and also giving freedom for 
certain types of people to circulate (the productive and obedient) although not to others. 
Developing countries’ metropolises such as Rio de Janeiro have an enormous contingent of 
people that must be controlled in their circulation to preserve a given social order based on 
social inequality and segregation. Currently, however, neither the Northern nor the Global 
Southern cities provide a clear-cut traditional, historical and very well-known enemy (the 
dangerous classes represented by poor, immigrant and dark-skinned people) associated with a 
new potential enemy (almost everybody who lives out of the productive flows of the 
contemporary economy) (Rodrigues et al., 2017).  
In this sense, the “urban militarization” described by Graham (2010) could be taken as one 
of the governmental tactics of the society of control, matching explicit elements of 
militarization – as it happens in Rio’s favelas – with many stealthier forms of surveillance 
represented by the enormous variety of electronic devices that surround and touch us, manned 
both by public and private security agents. A new kind of social controlling emerges, 
combining state security practices, a broad “urban militarization” process, and local social 
collaboration which include anonymous denouncements, self-surveillance and some levels of 
adhesion from local organizations (NGOs and popular organizations). All together, they 
produce a complementary face of policing practices that come from bellow (the level of social 
practices) and connect with those coming from above (the state) (Augusto, 2013). 
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Mega-events appear as one of the sparking elements of the current societies of control. Huge 
international mega-events such as UN summits, music festivals, entrepreneurs’ fairs, and sports 
competitions (like the FIFA’s World Cup and the Olympic Games) mobilize legal reforms, 
international partnerships between foreign police and military special squads, agreements on 
justice data exchange, and programs for the renewal of military and police equipment and 
training. In this sense, Rio de Janeiro has proven to be one of the most globally connected 
urban spaces in the global society of control. Since the 1980s the city has established itself as 
one of the most important centers for mega-events in the world. Nevertheless, the 2014 World 
Cup and specially the 2016 Olympic Games have brought novelties in terms of governmental 
tactics that go beyond the events themselves. For example, in 2011 the Brazilian Federal 
Government created the Extraordinary Secretary for the Major Events Security, under the 
Ministry of Justice, and focused on build specific security polices for the 2013 FIFA’s 
Confederation Cup, the 2014 World Cup, the Olympic Games and any other major event. The 
main goal of this Secretary was to “obtain a pacific and safe environment” for the realization 
of those events (Brazil, 2011). The same document highlighted the “important legacy” that will 
be left in terms of security infrastructure and training. 
The theme of the “security legacy” is crucial because all the legal reformulations and new 
policies, particularly those related to the acquisition of controlling technologies, have been 
described as an increase of the state capacity to enforce law. The Federal Act that established 
the Secretary also mentions that the “public investments in that area [security] must signify 
permanent advances for society, representing a qualitative step forward in the sustainable 
decreasing of crime rates”. It is important to notice the direct relationship between the 
realization of the mega-events and the internal crime/security issues. 
Connected to international standards and demands of security, and focusing on internal and 
external potential threats (terrorism, organized crime and regular crime), the Brazilian 
preparation for the mega-events could be analyzed as a political and tactical update of state 
security capacities in the society of control. In fact, we believe that it is possible to understand 
the arrangements in urban security and law enforcement around Rio’s mega-events beyond the 
regular discipline techniques limited to controlling delimited areas (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009). 
Instead it would be possible to identify traditional tactics of control and urban discipline 
(policing, police incursions into favelas) combined with new technologies of surveillance and 
control (integrated video systems, drones, continued military and police occupations). The 
occupation of favelas and the growing presence of military forces are part of this large process 
of updating and adaptation of security practices and policies in Rio. 
We argue that it is in course, in Rio de Janeiro, the configuration of a broader project that 
seeks to build up an ambience of security in the city understood as the process of creating areas 
of control that literally pacify local tensions without solving the economic, political and cultural 
sources of social conflict. Pacify is itself a military terminology applied to describe the cease 
of hostilities in a given territory assured after a military occupation. It does not mean, for 
instance, peace in a positive sense, but a state of paralysis guaranteed when a superior armed 
force imposes itself over its opponents. However, the current pacification in Rio de Janeiro is 
not just the outcome of a traditional infantry victory and occupation, but a work-in-progress 
which combines the appropriation of some regions of the city in order to make them available 
for gentrification and real estate speculation, while allowing the circulation of tourists, middle 
and up-classes citizens, as well as impoverished people who make the city move forward 
working as waiters, policemen, private security agents, doormen, soldiers, manual labors, 
maids, domestic workers, etc. 
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In this context, the favelas taken as “open-air concentration camps” are, at least in the 
official discourse, integrated to the general economic, social and political city life, while states’ 
presence is noticed by the articulation of explicit means of force (UPP and Army’s Pacification 
Force) and subtle modalities of control represented by the entrance into the slums of public and 
private services. Drug-trafficking and gangs’ operations do not cease, but they are reconfigured 
and adapted, and in some case, they simply move for other cities and unpacified favelas. Thus, 
the military style of controlling the city is composed by combination of military explicit 
presence, Military Police regular and pacifying operations, and the whole set of control 
technologies and practices of the society of control providing a secure ambience for business. 
For that we can identify a modus military of control and government verifiable not only in the 
explicit security policies, but also in the tiny details of our contemporary urban life. 
In this sense, Rio de Janeiro is a city fully integrated to the governmental flows of the society 
of control with its transterritorial connections and local demands. In Rio, the modus military is 
present both in the confrontational tactics by the Military Police (and the new Army’s presence 
in the lasting occupation of favelas), and in the spread of technologies of control supported by 
novel forms of collaborative citizen participation – such as the denouncing-phone (a NGO 
dedicated to receiving anonymous denounces of crimes which are then communicated to the 
police) – used to transform any citizen in a police informer. The “police-citizen” (Augusto, 
2013) complements and reassures the public law enforcement agents and the private security 
actors in the effort of producing a secure city, with its conflicts contained, but not solved. 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
The “pacification doctrine”, as put by Arantes (2014), maintains much of the national security 
doctrine formulated during the military rule under influence of the US anti-communist policy: 
according to this author, the old communist “internal enemy” was now converted into the 
criminal or the drug dealer menace. Nevertheless, both then and now, the international 
influences are translated into a local accent which has its roots in the deepest elements of 
Brazilian social fabric. 
The 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games offered windows of opportunity 
to boost the process that has updated some aspects of the Brazilian security practices by 
including new technologies of control and novel articulations among police forces, armed 
forces and private security contractors. This trend toward a production of an ambience of 
security in Rio is under course in a context of legal and political uncertainty in Brazil. However, 
the analytical lenses provided by Foucault’s and Deleuze’s insights on surveillance, control 
and government of populations can offer an interesting perspective for studying and 
understanding the current transformations in Brazil’s – particularly in Rio’s – security 
practices. 
Finally, by analyzing Rio’s mega-events we can identify the interpenetration of historical 
governing practices and elements of new technologies of power and control. The traditional 
prejudice against the black and the poor, namely of those who live in favelas, is still a crucial 
factor in the definition of security practices in Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, this population is 
not controlled as it used to be. That is why the preparation and the legacy of those mega-events 
are not alien to the Rio’s security dynamics; instead, they reconnect it to the new tactics of 
governing populations in the society of control. 
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